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Charles Hawksley*
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The possibility of an ‘arc of instability’1 across the Western Pacific states of Papua
New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Fiji carries serious security concerns for
the entire Pacific region. This paper examines Australian-led interventions in Papua
New Guinea and the Solomon Islands to analyse the effects that they are having on
the concept of sovereignty, both for states in the Western Pacific region and for
international relations more generally. It argues that the nation-state ideal is under
severe strain and that failed states are symptomatic of a wider problem of legitimacy,
caused in part by the liberal assumption underpinning the social contract that entail
one the one hand protection and on the other service delivery. As many states fail in
this respect of delivering the political goods — rule of law, security, infrastructure,
medical care and civil and human freedom — the notion of sovereignty has now been
exposed for the fiction it has essentially been for most states, at least in the 20th
century. If states cannot provide then intervention and state reconstruction marks a
return to the nation-building project that characterised post WWII international
politics. It also invites questions of diminished sovereignty and forces a reassessment
of the capacity of states to meet the expectations of their citizens. It may be that the
time has come to think beyond state sovereignty as the basis of international order and
to return to imperial or semi-imperial constructs, particularly forms of indirect rule, to
guarantee global human security. If states are failing then sovereignty is expendable.
* The author thanks the Faculty o f Arts, University o f W ollongong, for funding to attend the 2005
Australasian P olitical Studies A ssociation Conference at the University o f Otago, Dunedin, N ew
ZealSnd.

The amorphous nature of Sovereignty

Since at least the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the notion of sovereignty has been
central to the study of international relations. Sovereignty has generally been seen as a
set of claims that politically organised groups occupying a defined territory make to
other groups occupying different territories. Such claims centre on the group’s right to
be regarded as self-governing, that they are capable of managing their own affairs and
that others should keep out of their defined territory and their political affairs. For
these claims to exist and to be recognised some form of central constituted authority,
such as a government administration, is required. This power can then attempt to
enforce its writ over the people who live within its boundaries, and to exclude all
external influences. It becomes, in effect, the sovereign power of the state. This is a
view that sees sovereignty as absolute and as a shibboleth of modern statehood. For
international law to function states require the capacity to enter into treaties as equals,
so by extension sovereignty implies a legal equality between the political states of the
world. States would further claim to resit external influences in their decision-making
processes. Even if the absolute notion of sovereignty is a fiction, it is a necessary one,
as the international political system was constructed on this principle.

Rejecting the absolutist approach to sovereignty by arguing that it has been
consistently undermined, Stephen Krasner has usefully picked apart the concept to
suggest that there are in fact four central ideas that create sovereignty:
■ Domestic sovereignty — the classical interpretation where the state as
sovereign controls all activity within its borders.
■ Interdependence sovereignty — the ability of a state to seal its borders to
prevent the entry or exit of people or commodities.
■ International legal sovereignty — the acceptance by other states of a state’s
right to exist, and to give it recognition as a state.
■ Westphalian sovereignty — other states refraining from interference in the
domestic politics of any state.2
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Krasner argues that for as long as sovereignty has been around it has been a flawed
concept. It is partial and it is consistently diminished by the actions of other states.
Fowler and Bunk argue a similar position, analysing legal precedents in international
politics that encroach on the absolute rights of states.3 However as Philpott argues,
neither approach actually negates either the claims that states make to hold
sovereignty nor the validity of the concept itself.4 The decades from the 1940s to the
1970s resulted in the universalisation of the nation-state project. Claims for state
sovereignty were a feature of decolonisation as peoples around the world struggled for
self-determination. States and government around the world are now similar in that at
the national level they all have bureaucracies and ministries and they all claim
national sovereignty. Largely because of decolonisation the number of states in the
international state system has also grown, from around 50 in 1900 to over 200 in
2005, yet only a handful operate according to the principles of liberalism, democracy,
civil society, rule of law and free trade, the characteristics regarded as being essential
to guarantee human security. As Kaplan has observed, many states are states in name
only.5 With around 200 states, many suffer from various levels of dysfunction, and
sometimes in ‘weak’ states this dysfunction becomes critical, even terminal. The
spectre of the ‘failed state’ — or the even more serious ‘collapsed state’— has given
rise to situations where in the partial or complete absence of legitimate state control
over its own territory, the international respect for the notion of sovereignty is deemed
to be of secondary importance to the possible problems that disorder will produce.6
The effects of state collapse are just as dangerous for those inside the state as those
without. It is increasingly clear that in the post-Cold War world of increased
connection through globalisation, some states are now willing to override the notion
of state sovereignty for purposes of their own, or for regional or international security.

Sovereignty and failed states

‘Failed state’ describes a situation in which an internationally recognised government
is either unwilling or incapable of asserting control over its domestic affairs. Though
3
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it may claim a right to sovereignty, the evidence of its demonstrable inability to
restrict crime, impose centralised order or even control its own territory, indicates that
it has lost legitimacy within its own borders. This is not to suggest that total anarchy
reigns over a failed state, rather that forms of order may spring up with localised and
often violent power structures exerting control over regions and communities. The
category of the failed state thus covers a variety of situations such as complete state
collapse and descent into warlordism (Somalia), civil war driven by ‘ethnic cleansing’
(Bosnia), or civil war driven by a contest for power (Cambodia).7 In these cases, the
internationally recognised government (if one exists or can be identified) is not able to
bring forces within the state under its control, and it cannot seem to achieve a peaceful
political solution, either through intransigence or simple incapacity.

What is most apparent in the study of failed states is the geographic specificity of the
phenomena. It happens most in what was the former colonial world, and mostly in the
‘new states’ created by decolonisation. The failed or failing state is prominent in
Africa and parts of Asia, but the atypical example was the fracture of Yugoslavia.8
The Western Pacific’s apparent ‘arc of instability’ may indeed be evidence of this
phenomenon in the antipodes.

Apart from the obvious human cost, failed states are thought to encourage trade in
armaments, narcotics, people (both women and children) and wildlife. The possibility
of terrorism being fostered in collapsed states has recently emerged as a significant
security problem. Dupont claims criminal groups are drawn to jurisdictions where
enforcement is weak or absent, for in such an environment the profits may be
unchecked.

Activities prohibited

elsewhere

can exist.

The United Nations

Development Program’s 1999 Human Development Report estimated profits from the
activities of organised crime syndicates to total c. US$1.5 trillion dollars an amount
that at the time would have ranked it about fourth in the world as a ‘national
economy’. The chief revenue rasing activities that may be going on in failed states are
said to be:
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■ drugs (particularly heroin, cocaine, and more recently amphetamines and
ecstasy)
■ corruption (kickbacks, extortion, bribes, kidnapping)
■ money laundering (often from drug profits)
■ people trafficking (sex trade in women and children, irregular migration)
■ firearms (gun running)
■ terrorism (covering both the criminal aspects and the fundraising aspects of
non-state actors and other political groups).9 (Ibid, 200-205).

Failed or failing states can be havens for general lawlessness and transnational crime,
and, as Alan Dupont notes, “in some states crime and politics are virtually
indistinguishable, either because the state has been co-opted by criminals or because
the people who run the state are themselves criminals.”10 Failing states may be lax in
enforcing their own rules, or they may even have no rules, but in a collapsed state the
administrative bureaucracy essentially ceases to exist. Criminal elements may come to
operate and inhabit part or all of the country, but they do so without the official
sanction or cooperation of the recognised government. The adherence of a collapsed
state to international law is threatened as, even though the principle of pacta sunt
servanda means states are bound by the international treaties they sign,11 the signature
of a state on an international instrument is only as good as its will or capacity to
enforce its own laws. In collapsed states, capacity is absent and failure to prevent
criminal activities from occurring represents significant dangers for neighbouring
states.

As failed states have become a major issue over the past decade, the study of how to
prevent state failure has also become an established part of social science literature,
particularly in sub-disciplines of international relations such as peace and conflict
studies. The upsurge in the number of post-cold War peacekeeping missions prompted
the creation in 1994 of the US State Failure Taskforce. This body attempted to
analyse the phenomenon of state failure and collapse with a view to predicting its
incidence and probability. Headed by then Vice-President A1 Gore, the Taskforce had
5
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the job of collecting and collating data from ‘high-risk’ countries and devising a set of
warning signs and indicators for when failure was probable. It was government
funded and staffed by social scientists, experts in data collection and consultants in
statistical methods. This Taskforce defined state failure as comprising:
■ revolutionary wars — where a group attempts to overthrow the ruling regime;
■ ethnic wars — conflicts where ethnic, religious or communal minorities seek
changes in status;
■ genocides and politicides — state sponsored deaths of communal or minority
groups;
■ adverse or disruptive regime transitions — when a state becomes unstable or
shifts toward authoritarian rule to prevent collapse.12

The method utilised gathered data for the two years prior to when a state was deemed
to have failed and contrasted it with control data with three instances of non-state
failure in the same year. It estimated that under this classification there had been 114
instances of state failure between 1955 and 1998, in some of the 195 countries
considered. It then predicted the probability of states (as a number between 0 and 1)
of a state suffering the complete or partial collapse of their authority. A score of 0.5
would mean that a state had an equal chance of failing as it did of surviving; closer to
0 the state’s survival became more assured, closer to 1 the prognosis was that the state
was becoming unstable and heading for collapse. On assessing their data the taskforce
refined their ‘drivers’ of state failure:
■ quality of life (including infant mortality);
■ regime type (the level of democracy — refined further into the classifications
of full democracy, partial democracy and autocracy);
■ the ethnic or religious composition of the state; and
■ international influences, including the degree of trade openness.

As the Taskforce saw it, the failure of states affects development and democracy, as
well as the growth of individual liberty and free trade. Where states had high infant
mortality, low international trade openness and two or more bordering conflicts, the
6
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likelihood that they would fail was double. Where the regime was a partial democracy
failure was up to seven times higher.13

This is a circular argument. States with lower levels of development tend to have
higher infant mortality, and are more likely to be ruled by the gun than the ballot box.
They are normally colonial constructs uniting a variety of ethic groups so they are
also diverse. Placed under centralised power, and in the absence of developed civil
society groups to balance state power with public freedom, conflict is perhaps
inevitable, especially if the state does not perform in service delivery. It is hardly
surprising that marginalised groups within states have few reasons to support
centralised control and will attempt to gain power themselves to improve their
conditions. The Taskforce’s methodology basically de-historicised the conditions
under which states had developed and concentrated on indices and numbers as
predictors. King and Zheng’s study of the Taskforce’s model and results found that it
also drastically overestimated the likelihood of state failure. They argue the
Taskforce’s drives are actually more likely to be indicators of state failure. Low levels
of democracy, low trade openness and high infant mortality tell you more about how a
failing state operates — what has already happened in a state — than why a state may
later fail. In some states it may be possible that nothing works as it would in a
developed state, although the state does not implode or collapse.14

Ultimately whether a state is stable or unstable, collapsing or not collapsing, appears
to be a matter mostly of international, not domestic, perception. Some weak states
should probably fail but survive; other weak states appear to be failing and then
suddenly collapse.15 When a state truly collapses (such as in Somalia in 1991) the
international community moves, as ‘something must be done’. Debates over what to
do when a state collapses return to the vexed notion of sovereignty. In the struggle to
gain territory and to assert claims of internal and international legitimacy, innocent
civilians, including women and children, are the main casualties. The recent refusal
of the international community to allow humanitarian catastrophes to go unchecked
7
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has prompted the solution of stopping the killing by overriding state sovereignty
through armed intervention.

Sovereignty and Intervention

The international community does not have a specific or particular plan for
responding to the failure of a state, although intervention followed by nation building
is fast becoming the norm for failed states. The scope and mandate of UN and
regional assistance missions has varied greatly, from tens of thousands of troops in
monitoring and assistance roles in Cambodia, to similar numbers with peace
enforcement responsibilities in the Congo, to a handful of observers in Bougainville.
The ultimate purpose of all such interventions is to recreate a workable state of affairs
through confidence and security building measures, capacity building, commerce and
aid. In line with the idea that the way to ‘fix’ states is to reconstruct them, rather than
to allow them to disintegrate and create wider instability, these processes are
generally termed ‘nation-building’ (or more aptly ‘nation re-building’) and require a
form of temporary occupation. In Berger’s wide-ranging definition, nation-building
can encompass formal military occupation, counter-insurgency, peacekeeping,
national reconstruction, foreign aid and the use of stabilization forces.

1 fi

Fukuyama’s recent State Building argues that culture is the least easily adapted
element essential for functioning states.17 The types of Westminster style
administrative and governmental systems developed for PNG, Solomon Islands, Fiji
and other Pacific states do not perhaps address the perceived needs of their people.
This is complex territory; examinations of other interventions in Cambodia and East
Timor assist in placing what is happening now in the Pacific in historical context. To
change culture is not impossible, but it does require long term planning and the
existence of institutions that function rests to a certain extent on the desire to have
such institutions. At this level, it becomes a chicken and egg argument. Intervention
and state re-building may create the desire for public institutions. The question is
whether they are appropriate for the societies they administer. Nation building
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involves a large component of outside direction in the construction of administration
in a state. Sovereignty has never been absolute, but struggling states are now being
subjected to renewed efforts to make them fit the liberal mould, which may or may
not be appropriate for all societies and cultures.

Interventions are justified by a report by the Canadian government-sponsored
initiative, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty that
claims there now exists not so much the ‘right to intervene’ but a wider ‘responsibility
to protect ’. Governments have a duty to care for their populations, but when they are
either unwilling or unable to do so, then “... interventionary measures by other
members of the broader community of states may be required”.18 The total respect
for sovereignty has now become partial. The new doctrines of peacekeeping involve
intervention and deployments of advisers, aid workers, police and troops. This shift
from ‘first’ to ‘second’ generation peacekeeping was a move from a relatively simple
role of entering a conflict with the consent of parties to monitor ceasefires, to the
more complex role of multifunction operations, many of which suffer from ‘mission
creep’ and expanding mandates. The activities taken on by intervening forces have
also been transformed, due to more complex mandates and more challenging
circumstances. The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor was
effectively operating as a ‘state-in-waiting’; the United Nations Interim Mission in
Kosovo has created an international protectorate zone within the sovereign state of
Serbia.

Because of the inability to get UN missions on the ground quickly, even despite high
levels of violence and widespread deaths, interventions are often perceived as
occurring ‘too little too late’. By the time the UN or another force actually goes into a
state to prevent humanitarian catastrophe, many people have already been killed or
displaced, and damage to people and property is often widespread. Episodes such as
Rwanda, where the Security Council scaled down the UN’s commitment due to the
apparent dangers (only to result in one of the centuries worst genocides) pointed to a
need to redefine the peacekeeping mission. The ‘Brahimi report’ of 2000
9
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recommended, among other things, the formation of an international UN standing
force.19 Recent international relations literature is studded with such references to ‘the
right to intervene’ and ‘the responsibility to protect’ but due to the costs of long term
commitments states are often unwilling to lend forces to the UN until an appropriate
exit strategy has been formulated.20

Regional organizations have emerged as alternatives to UN interventions and may be,
in some cases, more appropriate or more effective. They have the benefit of
understanding the context and of de-politicising the problems as they may avoid the
obligatory references to be US, French or British neo-colonialism.

In Africa the

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have authorised missions
to, amongst other states, Cote d’Ivoire21 while the African Union has been present in
Darfur in Sudan. These aim to separate parties and build peace; with Africans policing
other Africans, there is a greater degree of ownership over the peace process. In the
Pacific however the asymmetries of state power make intervention even more
asymmetrical.

Sovereignty and Intervention in the Western Pacific

In the Western Pacific the past decade has proved increasingly difficult for small
island states, and to some extent their much larger neighbours such as Fiji and PNG.
Economic difficulties have added to the pressure to downsize administrations and led
to a crisis in governance in some states. The situation in the Western Pacific has
deteriorated to the point where Australia has altered its previous respect for the
sovereignty of Pacific states and is now choosing to intervene where it perceives
problems exist, or may exist in the future. This has been done through the Pacific
Islands Forum in the Case of the Solomon Islands, but unilaterally in the case of
Papua New Guinea.

In the Pacific the viability of small states remains as problematic now as when
independence was first gained in the 1960s and 1970s. Size of domestic markets,
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small populations, high unemployment, high migration, high transport costs and a
lack of lack of infrastructure mean that many Island states compete against each other
for a limited share of the import market to Australia and New Zealand.22 Economic
problems compound the absence of effective governance and allegations of corruption
in Pacific governments abound. Tuvalu is the exception to the rule, mostly through
the good fortune of being allocated the abbreviation ‘tv’ when the internet domain
names for countries were allocated.23 Despite having large phosphate reserves Nauru
has squandered its fortunes through a series of poor investment decisions. Financial
problems compound the likelihood of perversion of proper governmental process. In
2001 Australia purchased the compliance of Nauru and PNG in housing asylum
seekers for a reported AUD$20 million each.24. By any measure, the ‘Pacific solution’
indicated the asymmetry of power in the Pacific. As the regional superpower,
Australia had of course been the dominant power in the Western pacific. The
difference now was that Australia was becoming less interested in respecting the
sovereignty of Pacific States and more interested in fixing perceived problems of noncompliance and instability.

With very small Western Pacific states, aid and economic pressure are used to force
changes to policies and behaviour. When implicated in money laundering to the tune
of $80bn, Nauru was placed on the Financial Action Taskforce (FATF) list of noncompliant countries and territories.25 In under-funded states that lack the capacity to
combat new forms of economic or security threat, such as money laundering and
terrorism, Australia assists by providing ready-made criminal legislation to strengthen
the capacity of a government to combat crime. The Australian Federal Police work to
support governance and law with all Pacific states through the Law Enforcement
Cooperation Program. 26 The effectiveness of any such measures depend on the
existence of an functional state structure and government that is considered to be
legitimate.

Sometimes further steps are required, and higher degrees of intervention are
contemplated. In the case of RAMSI, a parlous state of affairs in the Solomon Islands
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had existed since 1999. There was an attempt in 2000 to establish a regional policing
force (the International Peace Monitoring Team) to observe the fragile peace created
by the Honiara Peace Accord and the Panatina Agreement (both of 1999), and the
Buala Peace Conference and the Auki Peace talks of May 2000.27 In January 2003
Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer had claimed “Australia is not about to
recolonise the south Pacific, nor should it. These are independent sovereign countries
with their own constitutions”.28 By May 2003, the idea for an armed intervention
force took hold. The Department of Foreign Affairs has stated that the main factor in
the intervention was the degree of willingness of other Pacific states to override the
notion of state sovereignty; the Solomon Islands government also wanted an
intervention force and neighbouring Pacific islands agreed to i t 29

Ostensibly a multi-country taskforce, RAMSI is Australian dominated and Australianled. The idea that through intervention the sovereignty of the Solomon Islands state
can be restored is clearly problematic; sovereign states do not normally allow armed
foreign troops to deploy on their territory, unless under visiting forces agreements.
There are exceptions to this, including the Vanuatu government in 1979 permitting
PNG troops to assist it in putting down an insurrection, however the idea that a state
requires others to guarantee law and order goes to the heart of the problem. The
results in the Solomon Islands appear impressive, and from its initial deployment in
May and June 2003 the security situation has certainly stabilised. The Australian
police (Federal and State) and their Pacific counterparts, both Solomon islanders and
those from other countries such as New Zealand, Tonga, Fiji and Vanuatu, have
collected a large number of improvised and manufactured weapons and arrested
people on charges of murder. Arguably this sort of intervention was effective as the
force deployed was overwhelming both in terms of numbers and firepower, and once
the weapons collection was mostly complete, the community policing has re
established trust in institutions as a basis of civil society. RAMSI was required
because of the total breakdown of administration in the islands, a situation where no
body accepted the right of the government to govern. How long it will stay is not
known, although the ‘whole of government’ approach requires a comprehensive
12
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rebuilding of institutions so it may be the next generation of Solomon Islands leaders
who bid farewell to RAMSI.30

Where RAMSI had regional support, even through an Australian led Pacific islands
forum, the case for PNG is quite different. The Enhanced Cooperation Program
(enshrined as the Joint Agreement on Enhanced Cooperation of 13 August 2004) was
designed to assist the capacities of the Papua New Guinea State. Clearly, Australia
fears state collapse in PNG and the ECP has been Australia’s initiative. Mike
Manning claims it was PNG’s idea, but the offers no actual evidence and the
historical record suggests otherwise.31 In December 2003, the governments of
Australia and Papua New Guinea concluded the Enhanced Cooperation Program
(ECP) agreement that aims, amongst other things, to increase the capacity of the PNG
state to develop something called good governance. This term is bandied about with
monotonous regularity as if its meaning is clearly understood. It can describe anything
from public sector ‘reform’, downsizing/’rightsizing’ of government bureaucracies
and the abolition or creation of administrative practices.

For PNG the ECP meant accepting over 200 Australian Federal Police (AFP) and
other officers as assisting police personnel, along with some 64 other advisers, to act
in bureaucratic managerial and actual policing roles (DFAT 2004). While Australia
has historically provided legal officers and key advisors to PNG as part of the general
aid programme, this is the most ‘hands-on’ approach by Australia to perceived
failures in PNG governance since PNG became independent in 1975. The idea of
Australian bureaucrats and police was strongly resisted by elements within the PNG
government during early 2004 and the agreement was not finalised until July of that
year. Ultimately PNG accepted the ECP because it had no choice to refuse. But there
is still a sovereign state and the sting in the tail for Australia was when the PNG
supreme court ruled the provision of sovereign immunity to police personnel
contravened the country’s constitution. Australia insists on immunity for its officers,
PNG will not accept it. At the time of writing no solution has been found, but the
advisers, a term reminiscent of colonial advisers in protectorates who managed the
13
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affairs of state, remain. They exercise control over spending and budgetary
processes.32

Conclusions: unequal sovereignty

Both of these Pacific interventions have occurred because Australia fears for its own
security and because of Australian understandings that others outside of the region,
principally the US, expect it to be a serious contributor to world order.33 Token
deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan help, but to be viewed as a serious contributor to
the Western alliance Australia has to be seen to promote stability in its own sphere of
influence. Australia’s capacity to contribute to a coalition of international powers rests
on its ability to enforce the rule of law in the relatively small countries of the Pacific.
These concerns about state stability and the supremacy of law reflect the 1904
Roosevelt corollary to the Monroe doctrine which argued that civilised states need to
intervene in situations of general concern. In its own return to the Roosevelt corollary,
the US has adopted the role of state conqueror and re-builder in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The neo-conservative administration argues that its unchallenged power should be
used to construct ‘just’ states — those that will respect the civilisation norms of
international law. In the Western Pacific the US clearly sees the compliance of states
with the rule of law as case Australia’s responsibility. As a part of the Western
alliance Australia must do its bit for stability in the Pacific.

The two Pacific cases mirror events elsewhere in the world and call into question the
equality of sovereign states in international relations. It may well be that the nation
state project has failed in many parts of the world, including in the Pacific, but nation
states remain. The critical test of state viability appears to be a state’s capacity to
deliver political goods in return for obedience and order. When the state reneges on its
half of the bargain, it becomes irrelevant to its own citizens; if it then turns coercive to
enforce compliance they have every right to resist. We may be shifting to a ‘post
sovereignty’ world as the importance of sovereignty as an organising principle in
international relations is under severe challenge though interventions that vary in
14
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scope and intensity. Those states that invite intervention or have intervention thrust
upon them are clearly struggling to be effectively sovereign. If they cannot control
their own territory they are less than equal to states that can. They remain states in the
sense that the international community accepts a patch of territory has a name but the
new interventionism has important consequences for international relations. If,
following realism, the ability to project power decides the standards of justice that
exists within societies, then Australia’s economic, military and political power will
create justice in the Pacific. If however, in the process of intervening, Australia
approaches the Pacific with heavy-handed dealings in supposedly independent states
then it diminishes its effectiveness and capacity to create viable institutions. The
difficulty lies in being effective without looking like interfering or being ‘imperial’.

The two Pacific cases demonstrate emerging norms of intervention: they are unilateral
or regional rather than (multilateral in the sense of the UN); they aim to build or
rebuild the state; they are armed; and they are there for the long term. While the
RAMSI commitment has been spoken about in terms of ten years, the ECP funding
was for five years. If PNG’s problems are as severe as many commentators seem to
think,34 the ECP appears to be a band aid solution. In any case, it may not now go
ahead, or certainly not in the same form. Neither intervention has a clear criteria for
success, and thus no clear exit strategy can be deduced. Perhaps Australia, like the
US, now considers that temporary occupation or ‘empire lite’ is a necessary evil if
national security, and to an extent regional security, is to be maintained. Interventions
of this sort herald the death of the concept of sovereignty for nations experiencing
difficulty, especially those thought to be potentially collapsing states. Aid and
interference in administration re-creates the indirect rule of the colonial period.
Indirect rule or even empire lite is clearly a more realistic response to the possibility
of state collapse than observing sovereignty as the reconstruction of state authority
requires long-term capacity building. If the security of larger nations is perceived to
be at risk they will act to intervene and create solutions that are more suitable. In the
words of Teddy Roosevelt
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Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening o f
the ties o f civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require
intervention by som e civilized nation, and .... may force the United States,
however reluctantly, in flagrant cases o f such wrongdoing or impotence, to
the exercise o f an international police power.35

One hundred years later the new muscular Australian policy is neither reluctant nor
apologetic. The results of these Pacific interventions are important for Australia’s
position in the world, but for the peoples of the Pacific Islands, mending their states,
through whatever means, is vital as it will enable them to regain ownership over their
lives and their countries. In the modem world of human security, sovereignty is no
longer the shibboleth of statehood it once was.
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